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RECENT FEDERAL CASE
United States Liable Without Proof of Negligence under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has reopened a continuing debate which started with the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (referred to herein as FTCA). In Hess v.
United States,' the Government was held liable for the death of a workman
who was participating in the repair of the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia
River, though the district court found that the Government was in no way
negligent.2 This is surprising in view of the-pointed statement of the United
States Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States3 that recovery under
the FTCA requires some form of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
TaE HEss CASE
The deceased, George Graham, was employed by the Larson Construc-
tion Company, which had a contract with the United States to repair the
baffles (concrete protrusions for the purpose of braking the flow of current)
on the downstream face of the dam. Prior to performing that task, it was
necessary that soundings be taken in the spillway basin at the foot of the
dam. Graham was on the tug "Muleduzer" which was to tow a barge inf6
the spillway basin for that purpose. Because certain of the spillway gates
controlled by an employee of the Government were left open, the water in
the basin was extremely turbulent, causing the tug to capsize and sink.
Graham was drowned. His administrator, Henry L. Hess, Jr., brought this
action for damages against the United States under the FTCA.
The theory of the claimant, accepted by the court after an extended period
of litigation, was that the Government was liable under an Oregon "Em-
ployer's Liability Law" which states:
Generally, all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having
charge of, or responsible for, any work involving a risk. of danger -to the em-
ployes or the public, shall use every device, care and precaution which it is
practicable to use for the protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by
the necessity for preserving the efficiency of the structure, machine or other
apparatus or device, and without regard to the additional cost of suitable material
or safety appliance and devices.4
A determination by the United States Supreme Court5 that the Oregon
statute applied even though the injury took place on navigable waters paved
the way for the decision in question.
The court of appeals concurred with the district court that no proof of
negligence on the part of any agent of the United States was presented. 6
1282 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960).2 Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1958).
3 346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953).
'OR. R v. STAT. 654.305 (1959).
5 Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
6 Hess v. United States, 282 F.2d 633, 634 (9th Cir. 1960).
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However, in order to impose liability under the Oregon law it is not
necessary to find common law negligence, as the law "imposes upon the
employer a much higher degree of care than that which it would be obliged
to exercise under the common law."' The Employer's Liability Act does
not make the employer in an enterprise involving risk or danger strictly
liable as an insurer," but that point is closely approached, as the State In-
dustrial Accident Commission is empowered to enact a Safety Code, its
provisions having all the force and effect of law. Any violation of the code
constitutes negligence per se9 and the common law doctrines of assumption
of the risk, negligence of fellow servants, and contributory negligence do
not apply.10
The FTCA provides that "the United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances...
Hence the conclusion of the court that since a private individual could be
held liable for the death of Graham under these circumstances, the Govern-
ment could be liable under the FTCA. But this conclusion ignores what the
majority of courts have held; that is, "some act of misfeasance or nonfea-
sance is essential to government liability, since the act does not impose lia-
bility without fault, and does not extend to cases of absolute liability .... -12
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Almost as soon as the FTCA was passed, containing the provision that:
[T]he district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages,.. for ... personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable .... 13
a commentator made this dire prediction: "Determination of what consti-
tutes 'negligent or wrongful act or omission' may entangle unwary claimants
in intricate legal snarls.' 1 4 The first cases involving the problem were de-
cided in favor of the claimants. In Ure v. United States15 strict liability
was imposed upon the Government for flood damage to the claimant's land,
'Hoffman v. Broadway Hazelwood, 139 Ore. 519, 522, 10 P.2d 349, 351 (1932).
See also Howard v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 217 Ore. 516, 332 P.2d 621 (1958) ; Camen-
zind v. Freeland Furniture Co., 89 Ore. 158, 174 Pac. 139, 144 (1918).8 Shelton v. Paris, 199 Ore. 365, 261 P.2d 856 (1953).
9 Ibid. See also Snyder v. Seneca Lumber Co., 207 Ore. 572, 298 P.2d 180 (1956).
10 Union Oil Co. v. Hunt, 111 F.2d 269, 275 (9th Cir. 1940).
1 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
12 91 C.J.S. United States § 118, at 295 (1955) ; accord, 54 Am. JuR. United States
§ 94.5, at 90 (Supp. 1960).
13 Now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1958).
14 Note, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 540 (1947) in which the author goes on to identify spe-
cific problems relating to strict liability. See a similar statement in Street, Tort Lia-
bility of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crown Proceedings Act,
47 Micz. L. REV. 341, 350 (1949).
15 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950), rev'd, 225 F. 2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955) (after
Dalehite).
[VOL. 36
]RECENT FEDERAL CASE
the water coming from a government-operated irrigation system. In Boyce
v. United States,"6 a district court held that except for the "discretionary
function" exception, strict liability would be imposed for an injury resulting
from blasting by army engineers, it being an ultra-hazardous activity. In
another case' 7 it was held that the Government was strictly liable for plane-
crash damage under the common law rule of strict liability for ultra-
hazardous activities, the court saying that the term "wrongful" in the
FTCA included acts giving rise to strict liability. Each of these decisions
was made by a district court and each of them involved ultrahazardous
activities. The next year a district court held contrary in a comparable
situation. It decided that liability without fault could not be imposed upon
the Government under the FTCA where a man looking for scrap metal was
injured by the explosion of an active bomb fuse.'8 In the same year, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit announced the same rule by way of
dictum.'
In 1953 the Supreme Court made a declaration which should have put an
end to the controversy while it was still in the formative stage. A shipload
of government-owned ammonium nitrate fertilizer caught fire and exploded
at Texas City, killing several hundred people and injuring many others.
When the first suit arising from the tragic incident reached the Supreme
Court, the claimants were denied relief. The Court rejected the argument
that strict liability could attach to such operations under the FTCA:
[T]here is yet to be disposed of some slight residue of theory of absolute lia-
bility without fault... [T]he Act does not extend to such situations, though of
course well known in tort law generally. It is to be invoked only on a "negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of an employee. Absolute liability, of course, arises
irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself; it is imposed automatically
when any damages are sustained as a result of the decision to engaged in the
dangerous activity.... So it is our judgment that liability does not arise by virtue
either of United States ownership of an "inherently dangerous commodity" or
property, or of engaging in an "extra-hazardous" activity.20
The decision, although an explicit interpretation of this aspect of the act,
by no means ended the controversy. Dalehite has subsequently been modi-
fied in other respects by the Supreme Court 2' and there has been wide-
spread dissatisfaction with this portion of the holding.22
The above determination of the scope of "negligent or wrongful acts"
seems to have resulted in part from the belief of the Court that the act re-
quired a "clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity to give jurisdiction
of tort actions" 28 to the courts. The Court no longer construes the act this
narrowly. In a more recent case, it said, "there is no justification for this
Court to read exemptions into the act beyond those provided by Con-
16 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
7 Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
'
8 Flores v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 640 (D.N.M. 1952).
19 United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1952).20 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
21 See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
22 See, e.g., note 47 infra.2 3Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953).
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gress. ' ' 24 This has lead one commentator to conclude the following: "It is
now clear that the restrictive attitude, in relation to Government liability
under the act, expressed by the Court in the Dalehite case is virtually
nullified, if not expressly overruled, by the decision of the Court in the
Rayonier case."'25 The decision of the Court in the Dalehite case was by a
majority of four to three (Associate Justices Douglas and Clark not par-
ticipating). It would appear that subsequent changes in personnel have
made the Dalehite minority into the current majority.2 6 The same com-
mentator as above quoted has further concluded that, "there is little doubt
that this apparent reversal is due, in part at least, to the substantially
changed make-up of the court since its decision in Dalehite.' 27
The Supreme Court had an excellent opportunity in the Rayonier28 case
to re-affirm its stand against absolute liability under the FTCA in the face
of opposition not only from writers, but also from lower courts, but it did
not do so. The counter-argument, that the Court likewise ignored an op-
portunity to overrule this aspect of Dalehite in Rayonier is not quite cor-
rect. The Court cited several cases in which Dalehite had been limited and
certain of its implications rejected, one of them standing for the proposition
that the Government can be held strictly liable under a state statute.2 9
It is also interesting to note that the claimants from the Texas City
disaster, after their claims were denied by the Courts, obtained relief di-
rectly from Congress. 0 The Committee report on the bill contains language
which seems particularly illuminating as to the Congressional attitude
toward strict liability.
[T]he ammonium nitrate fertilizer, an inherently dangerous and hazardous
explosive, was introduced into the flow of commerce by the United States
Government without proper safeguards and warnings. That fact alone, in the
opinion of the committee, is sufficient to place responsibility on the Govern-
ment .... 31
Dalehite has been further criticized by one commentator3 2 because of the
determination that the term "wrongful" in the FTCA does not include acts
of ultrahazardous character which cause injury to person or property. 2
24 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) ; accord, United States
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949).25 Angoff, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A General View, 37 B.U.L. REv. 387, 390
(1957).26 For an analysis of the personnel of the Court on this issue see Peck, Absolute
Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 STAN. L. REV. 433, 436 n.18 (1957).27Angoff, supra note 24, at 390.
28 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). For an explanation see
Comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 259, 266 n.56 (1958).
29 United States v. Pralou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934
(1954)), cited in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 at 319 n.2 (1957). For a
discussion, see Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 433, 434, (1957).
20 Pub. L. No. 378, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
31 H.R. REP. No. 2024, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954); see also S. REP. No. 684,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1955).
22 Peck, supra note 29, at 441-48.
3 The Court said: "Petitioners rely on the word 'wrongful' though as showing that
something in addition to negligence is covered. This argument, as we have pointed out,
does not override the fact that the act does require some brand of misfeasance or non-
[VOrL. 36
RECENT FEDERAL CASE
After pointing out that the legal meaning of "wrongful" doesn't require
moral fault, seemingly the ground upon which the Court relied, -and that to
so hold would exclude many torts without good reason, he concludes that,
"absolute liability for engaging in an extra-hazardous activity is both a
tort liability and a liability for a 'wrongful' act, and hence a liability which
may be imposed under the act." 4
By way of summation, the Court in the Dalehite case explicitly stated
that the Government could not be held liable on a theory of absolute liability
without some misfeasance or nonfeasance,3 5 but that decision has been
strongly criticized and in fact modified in some respects by the Court itself.
It should be instructive, then, to observe what impact the Dalehite de-
cision has had on subsequent decisions of lower courts, and thus on the
later development of the controversy.
As might be expected, the majority of decisions involving the problem
embody a refusal to hold the Government strictly liable. 6 Almost all of
these rely expressly upon Dalehite. There is, however, a remarkably large
number of cases in which the lower courts have held the Government liable
without proof of common law negligence. United States v. Praylou,"7 al
feasance, and so could not extend to liability without fault; in addition, the legislative
history of the word indicates clearly that it was not added to the jurisdictional grant
with any overtones of the absolute liability theory." Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 45 (1953).
Compare the language used by the House Judiciary committee which added the word
in 1942. "The Senate bill covers only claims arising out of 'negligence' whereas the
recommended bill uses the phrase 'negligent or wrongful act or omission.' The com-
mittee prefers its language as it would afford relief for certain acts or omissions which
may be wrongful but not necessarily negligent." H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1942).
34 Peck, supra note 29, at 445. See also Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HAav. L. REv. 401 (1959).35 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32-34 (1953). In view of disallowance on
other grounds, the statement may be dictum, but it is certainly well-considered dictum.
3Potrv. United States, 228 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1955) (injury from exploding
army detonator not actionable) ; United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955)
(no liability under ultrahazardous activity reasoning regarding water storage) ; Wil-
liams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955) (use of res ipsa loquitur not
allowed where no showing that the plane crash could not have occurred in the absence
of negligence) ; Strangi v. United States, 211 F2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954) (no liability
where fire being used got out of control) ; Heale v. United States, 207 F.2d 414 (3d
Cir. 1953) (summary dismissal of problem, citing Dalehite) ; Harris v. United States,
205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953) (no liability for damage to adjoining land inflicted while
spraying own land to kill vegetation) ; United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1953) (no liability to child injured by explosive left when army camp dismantled) ;
Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (no liability
for damage inflicted by atom bomb test) ; Barroll v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 441
(D. Md. 1955) (no liability for damage caused by concussion of firing cannon) ; Danner
v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (no liability where dike gave way
flooding claimant's land).
37 United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953). The Court refused to
follow Dalehite; liability was found under Uniform Aeronautics Act which provides:
"The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the land or waters of this state is
absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath caused
by ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object there-
from, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or
in part by the negligence of the person injured or of the owner or bailee of the property
injured.. !'
See also Rayonier, Inc. v. United-States, 225 F.2d 642, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1955), where
1961]-
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airplane crash case, was decided on a theory of strict liability for injury
from an ultrahazardous activity. This seems indistinguishable from the
Dalehite case, or from the cases following it;" the only difference being
that the absolute liability was based on a statute rather than the common
law, certainly insignificant.
There are other methods by which the Government has been held liable
without proof of common law negligence under the FTCA, differing from
absolute liability in form but only slightly in practice. One of these is to
characterize conduct which might have given rise to strict liability as a
trespass, for it has been held by the Supreme Court that the term "wrong-
ful" used in the FTCA includes trespass.3 9 Thus, in an airplane crash case 0
very much the same as the Praylou case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit imposed liability without proof of negligence on a trespass theory.
Another method is the use of a presumption established by state law. In
D'Anna v. United States,4 the claimant could not prove negligence; but a
state statute provided that injury from the operation of aircraft gave rise
to a rebuttable presumption of liability, and liability was imposed on that
basis. In a large number of airplane crash cases, where it is impossible to
prove either negligence or the absence of negligence, such a presumption is
tantamount to an imposition of strict liability.
There are several instances where the Government has been free of
common law negligence, and yet has been held liable because an agent fell
below a higher standard of care imposed by a state statute. It is into this
category that Hess v. United States falls. A case arising in a very similar
situation, decided in the same way, is American Exch. Bank v. United
States.4 2 There liability without proof of negligence was imposed on the
United States under a Wisconsin "Safe Place Statute" imposing a duty
greater than that required by common law upon the owner of the premises.
It was specifically held by the trial court that there was no common law
negligence. 43 An almost identical situation is presented where the govern-
ment is held liable regardless of common law care where a state safety
statute is breached giving rise to what is characterized as "negligence per
the court refused to apply strict liability under a Washington Statute only to have the
judgment vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, 352 U.S. 317 (1957), though
without mention of that particular ground.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), which arose under
the same statute. It, however, followed Dalehite, saying that a statute imposing strict
liability is inapplicable when the suit is under the FTCA.
39 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
40United States v. Gaidys, 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952); accord, Dahlstrom v.
United States, 129 F. Supp. 772 (D. Minn. 1955) (flight one hundred feet above ground
was a trespass under state law, and thus "wrongful" under the act. Denial of recovery
under "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA reversed on appeal. 228 F.2d
819 (1956)).
41 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950) ; accord, United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529
(10th Cir. 1951) (airplane crash); Sapp. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D.
La. 1957) (res ipsa applied to plane crash) ; Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110
(S.D. W. Va. 1951) (airplane crash).
42 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958) ; accord, Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th
Cir. 1959) (Illinois Scaffold Act).
4s Williams v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Wis. 1956).
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se." 4 It might be said that these "statutory standard of care" situations
do not come within the scope of Dalehite, but they certainly predicate lia-
bility, not upon some act of "misfeasance or nonfeasance," 5 but rather, upon
some high standard closely approaching that of absolute liability. It would
seem that there is no logical place between them to draw a line between
Government liability and nonliability. If liability is to be imposed in the
one, then it should be imposed in the other and vice versa.
Thus, the question raised by the Hess case is whether the United States
should be compelled to pay claims under the FTCA where no negligence is
shown. As indicated by the discussion, there is no unanimity of feeling
among the courts. Neither is there unanimity among the commentators,
some favoring the rule established in the Dalehite case,"6 and a slightly
larger number advocating its abandonment.4 7 It does seem that the problem
requires more careful and thorough consideration by the courts.4 8
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In this connection, it would be instructive to consider the reasons for
which Congress originally passed the act. A similar bill was introduced in
the 77th Congress, and speaking in its behalf in his message to Congress on
January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt made the following points.4 9 A
great amount of time and effort of both Congress and the Executive are
consumed by private bills. During each of the prior three congresses more
than 2000 private claim bills were introduced, of which less than twenty
per cent became law. One-third of all bills vetoed by the President during
that period were private claim bills, and it cost almost $200 in direct ex-
penses alone to pass each one, often well in excess of the amount prayed for.
The procedure is slow and unfair as well as expensive, and providing for
judicial relief would aid efficient government and in particular the war
effort.
44 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954) (failure to put
flares the required two hundred feet from stalled truck on roadway) ; Worley v. United
States, 119 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ore. 1952). See also Annot., 1 L. ED. 2d 1647, 1654
(1956).
- Daehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953).
46 Otten, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Other Statutes Relating to Government
Liability: Exemplification by Government Aircraft Incidents, 65 DICK. L. REv. 35, 51
(1960) ; Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the Tort Liability of the Federal Govern-
nent, 67 HARv. L. REV. 994, 996-1001 (1954); Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 106
(1954) ; Note, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 1062 (1957).
4 Schwartz, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CommoN-LAW WORLD 303
(1954); Peck, supra note 29; Street, Tort Liability of the State: The Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Crown Proceedings Act, 47 Micn. L. REV. 341, 350 (1949);
Comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 259, 266 (1958); Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 542
(1947) ; Note, 23 TENN. L. REv. 243 (1954); Note, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 457.
48 Comment, 45 Ky. LJ. 518, 525 (1957): "It is immediately apparent from an
examination of the leading cases dealing with strict liability under the Act, that the
problem has not been adequately probed, either from a policy standpoint or from the
standpoint of orthodox statutory interpretation."
49 H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942) ; see also H.R. REP. No. 1287,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) ; Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and
Property Damages, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1325, 1328-29 (1954) ; Holtzoff, The Handling
of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoB. 311 (1942).
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.- It has been pointed out by other authorities that Congress is just not
equipped to handle proceedings which are by nature adversary and require
determinations of fact.50
Thus it would seem that it was a primary desire of Congress to be rid
of private claims in areas which could be handled by the courts. It is argu-
able that in order to implement this intent, the FTCA must be liberally
construed, 5 else claims will still ultimately end up in the hands of Congress,
as happened in the Dalehite case. There is some evidence of contrary in-
tent, 52 but it seems inconclusive in view of these overriding reasons for the
bill's passage.
. Because Congress intended that the courts take much of the load that it
had been carrying in this regard, the courts would do well to see how Con-
gress has treated instances of liability without fault. That certain well-
settled practices exist in Congress is evidenced by a commentator, who said:
We believe ... that the work of the committees produces not a mere "myriad of
single instances," but a reasonably coherent common law.
. Predictability of outcome implies, of course, that the committees tend to fol-
low their own prior legislative recommendations much as courts follow their
precedents.5s
If it were found that Congress has refused relief in "liability without fault"
situations, there would be ample warrant for the courts to deny relief, but
the contrary is the case. Reference has already been made to the fact that
Congress assumed liability for the Texas City disaster after relief had been
denied by the courts in the Dalehite case. Another "liability without fault"
situation handled by Congress has been described as follows:
Similarly, in the case of Robert Hilton, the Senate Judiciary Committee recom-
mended acceptance of governmental responsibility for injuries suffered by a child
in the explosion of a grenade he had found on an Army post. Negligence had
not been proved, and the courts in three strikingly similar cases had held that
it could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.... Beyond a doubt,
however, the physical agent of destruction was federally owned; and, while noting
the complete absence of proof of negligence, the Judiciary Committee expressed
"belief that there was a lack of due care upon the Army authorities in the control
of such a dangerous instrumentality." 54
Two examples are found where, during the Eighty-Second Congress, vic-
tims of airplane crashes were compensated through the procedure of pri-
vate bills, even though in both cases it was specifically found that there had
50 Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United
States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (1955). See also, S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25 (1946).
51 This argument was accepted in United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291, 294 (4th
Cir. 1953). See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
52 See note, 23 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 106, 109-10 (1954).
53 Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlements of Tort Claims against the United
States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1955).
5 Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1325, 1334-35 (1954) quoting from S. REP. No. 1259, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1954). The bill, S. 857, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), was signed by the
President on June 18, 1954.
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been no negligence on the part of the government.5 These bills would indi-
cate a willingness on the part of Congress that the Government be held
liable without proof of negligence in certain situations, including those
where the injuries arise from an ultrahazardous activity or instrumentality.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately the question is one of policy, requiring a balancing of con-
flicting interests-the danger of deterring activities beneficial to the public
by the imposition of liability as against extending the area wherein one in-
jured by an agent of the Government is left without relief. It seems doubt-
ful that the United States would be deterred from flying military aircraft,
testing atom bombs, engaging in irrigation and flood control projects, or
similar hazardous activities merely because of the threat of lawsuits by in-
jured persons. The countervailing factors, however, are persuasive. The
Government is the only agency which has control of these instrumentalities,
and thus the only one able to take precautions and institute safety measures.
Hence, the imposition of liability would tend to promote all possible care
at the only point where it could be exercised. Further, it is difficult to im-
agine any difference between the Government and a private person suffi-
cient to warrant the application of different rules in regard to strict liability.
Lastly, the question has been asked,
Is society best subserved in using the common law concept of "fault' as a meas-
uring rod of governmental responsibility, or should the test be predicated upon
the economic fact that a government is the best of all possible risk spreaders and
that perhaps the taxpaying public should ordinarily bear the losses resulting from
governmental activity ?56
The Supreme Court has recognized this element of the FTCA:
Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged
against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who con-
tribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden on
each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured
party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and ap-
parently did, decide that this would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits
from the services performed by Government employees.57
Under risk allocation analysis there is strong reason to urge that the Gov-
ernment be held strictly liable in these appropriate situations.
In light of these considerations, then, it would appear that the court of
appeals did not err in its conclusion in Hess v. United States. The decision
is in accord with a number of others concerning the ability of a state to
impose a high degree of care on the Federal Government, and though prac-
tically speaking it is contrary to Dalehite, it therein joins a virile minority,
and seemingly adheres to the better rule in light of Congressional intent
and underlying policy considerations.
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